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On June 23, 2016, the United Kingdom (UK) voted narrowly (52:48) to leave the European Union (EU). 
The UK government then officially notified the EU on March 29, 2017, of its intention to leave, thus 
triggering Article 50 of the EU Treaty, which specifies that within two years the UK will cease to be a 
member. However, the date for Brexit is still unclear as the European Union leaders have granted the 
UK a six-month extension to Brexit until October 31, 2019. Consequently, the nature of the economic 
relationship between the UK and the remaining EU-27 is still to be defined. 
Brexit will change the domestic and trade policies affecting agriculture in the UK and will have 
important implications for agricultural commodity trade worldwide. These trade policy changes are 
key factors in determining the consequences of Brexit for agricultural markets in Europe and 
elsewhere.  
Three possible alternatives to EU membership after Brexit are explored in the literature. (1) The 
Norway Option (i.e. UK remains in the Single Market); (2) the Swiss Option (i.e. bilateral agreements 
between the UK and EU); or (3) the WTO Option/ No Deal (i.e. UK - EU trade under World Trade 
Organisation terms). New trade relations will most likely be accompanied by increased trade 
transaction costs due to the introduction of border checks, tariffs and non-tariff measures. As a 
consequence of these changes to trade policy, there are likely to be significant factors affecting 
international agricultural trade which will have implications for the UK, the EU and third-party 
countries with trading relations with the EU or the UK.  
A number of studies have assessed the economic impact of the UK leaving the EU on the UK’s economy. 
In addition, there are a few studies that have assessed the potential effects of the UK exiting the EU 
on the UK agricultural sector using various scenarios and assumptions (Davis et al., 2017; Bellora et al., 
2017; Jongeneel et al., 2016; Van Berkum et al., 2016; Sik Choi et al., 2019). This report will review this 
existing literature assessing the potential effects of the UK exiting the EU on the UK economy and 
particularly on the agricultural sector using different scenarios and assumptions.  
This report is structured as followed. The next chapter presents descriptions of three possible post-
Brexit alternatives for UK-EU relations. Chapter 3 reviews studies that analysed the potential economic 
impacts of a UK exit from the EU on the UK’s economy and trade, respectively. Chapter 4 reviews 
studies that assessed the potential effects of the UK exiting the EU on the agricultural sector and trade 














An Overview of Access Options to the EU 
This chapter presents literature that examined the economic impacts of a withdrawal of the United 
Kingdom (UK) from the European Union (EU). These studies and reports have attempted to quantify 
the economic impact of Brexit on the UK using different scenarios and assumptions.  
Three possible alternatives to EU membership after Brexit are widely cited (Busch & Mattes, 2016). 
These are:  
1. the Norwegian Option, i.e. admission to the European Economic Area (EEA);   
2. the Swiss Option, i.e. bilateral agreements with the EU;  
3. the WTO/ No Deal Option where the UK’s trade relations with the EU would be organised 
according to the Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN) principle, which applies for all third countries 
where the EU does not have a preferential trade agreement.  
Generally, the WTO Option is considered as the ‘pessimistic/hard’ scenario for UK-EU post-Brexit 
relations, while the other two options are considered as ‘optimistic/soft’ scenarios.  
This section starts with the Norwegian and Swiss options that would give some degree of economic 
integration between the UK and the EU in terms of Brexit, then followed by the WTO/ No deal option 
that has no integration. However, whilst the Norwegian and Swiss scenarios are considered soft 
scenarios, this may not be the case for agriculture. 
2.1 Norwegian Option/European Economic Area (EEA) membership 
 
Norway is part of the European Economic Area (EEA) but not a member state of the EU. The EEA 
consists of 31 countries: the 28 EU member states, plus Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein. The latter 
three countries are the Member States of European Free Trade Association (EFTA). The three EFTA 
States and the EU Member States are united by the EEA Agreement1 (Dhingra & Sampson, 2016).  
The EEA Agreement entered into force in 1994, which guarantees Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein 
the free movement of persons, goods, services and capitals within the EU’s Single Market2, as well as 
non-discrimination and equal rules of competition throughout the EEA. This means that Norway 
participates in the EU Single Market, and it must comply with EU rules regarding the Single Market. 
However, Norway does not have a vote in deciding the rules of the Single Market (Dhingra & Sampson, 
2016).  
  
                                               
1 Switzerland is also an EFTA state, however, it is not covered by the EEA Agreement. Switzerland has a separate 
bilateral free trade agreement with the EU, which is discussed in Section 3.3 Swiss Option.  
2 The Single Market refers to the EU as one territory without any internal borders or other regulatory obstacles 






The EEA Agreement does not cover the common agriculture and fisheries policies, however it contains 
provisions on trade in agricultural and fish products. Other EU policies not included are the common 
trade policy; common foreign and security policy; justice and home affairs (the EEA/EFTA States are 
however part of the Schengen area); direct and indirect taxation; or economic and monetary union 
(EFTA, 2019).  
In addition, the EEA Agreement does not cover the EU Customs Union3. This means that Norway can 
set its own external tariff and negotiate its own trade deals with countries outside the EU (Dhingra & 
Sampson, 2016).  
The EEA members effectively contribute to the EU budget to be part of the Single Market. Norway 
make its financial contribution to the EU budget through the EEA and Norway Grant scheme. From the 
period 2014 to 2020, Norway’s average annual commitment to the EU was 447 million Euro (Dhingra 
& Sampson, 2016) which is 83 per cent of the UK’s payment to the EU on a per capita basis (House of 
Commons, 2013). The UK’s population is approximately twelve times larger than that of Norway. Thus, 
the UK could expect to continue contributing substantially to the EU’s budget after Brexit under the 
Norwegian Option (Dhingra & Sampson, 2016). 
If the UK choses the Norwegian Option, the EEA Agreement would give the UK the most access to the 
EU’s Single Market (see Table 2.1). The UK would maintain the Single Market regulations as well as 
social and employment regulations of the EU. However, the UK would be a rule-taker, which means 
that it would have less say in shaping its rules than it does now as an EU member (Dhingra & Sampson, 
2016).  
Other downsides to joining the EEA might be that UK exporters’ trade cost would increase due to the 
UK leaving the EU Customs Union. It has to comply with customs and rules of origins. Exports from 
Norway to the EU do not need regulatory checks, however, Norwegian exporters need to meet “rules 
of origin” requirements to benefit from preferential treatments. Under the Norwegian Option, the UK 
exporters would face increased trade transaction costs because of customs checks (Dhingra & 
Sampson, 2016).  
  
                                               
3 A Customs Union is a form of trade agreement. In a Customs Union, tariffs are eliminated between the states 
that form the Customs Union. Moreover, the participating states agree to apply a common external tariff to the 







Table 2.1: The relationship between Norway and the EU especially under the EEA. 
Included under EEA agreement 
Not included in 
EEA 
Goods: 
Some agricultural and fisheries products; Energy; Competition and state aid; 










Financial services; Transport Postal services; Electronic communication, 
audio-visual services and information society 
Capital Persons: 
Free movement of persons; Social security; Recognition of professional 
qualifications. 
Flanking and horizontal' policies: 
Consumer protection; Cultural Affairs; Education, training and youth; 
Research and innovation; Public health; Enterprise policy; Civil protection; 
Health and safety at work and labour law; Environment; Employment and 
social policy; company law; Budgetary matters; Gender equality, 
antidiscrimination and family policy 
Source: Adapted from EFTA4 and Booth et al. (2015). 
Norway has a heavily protected agricultural sector and has limited access to the EU’s agricultural 
sector. However, the EEA incorporates an agreement of trade in processed agricultural products 
(Protocol 3) and trade of basic agricultural products (Article 19). Protocol 3 regulates trade in processed 
agricultural products such as pizza and yogurt. Products included are subject to the general provisions 
of the EEA Agreement on the free movement of goods. In addition, Article 19 of the EEA entered into 
force between the EU and Norway on the 1st January 2012. Article 19 specifies that Norway and the 
EU should be committed to gradually liberalise trade in agricultural products. For Norway, Article 19 
means an increase in the tariff-free export of cheese to the EU, as well as tariff-free quotas for a 
number of agricultural products, including berries, various snacks, dog and cat food, cod liver oil and 
Christmas trees. In particular, since 2016, Norway has had an agreement with the EU for a tariff free 
quota of 4,500 tonnes of cheese. For the EU, Article 19 increases the tariff-free import quota for cheese 
and various meat products, as well as certain inputs for the food preservation and feed industries. 
Norway does not always fill the available export quotas, whereas the EU generally does (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, 2015).  
Under the Norwegian Option, the UK would reintroduce tariffs for its agricultural imports from the EU. 
The WTO tariffs would apply to third country imports. The UK could negotiate a trade agreement with 
the EU relating to agricultural products, as well as negotiate trade agreements with third countries. 
  
                                               







2.2 Swiss Option 
 
Switzerland is neither an EU member nor part of the EEA Agreement, but it has a number of sectoral 
bilateral agreements with the EU. Switzerland and the EU signed Bilateral Agreement in 1999; this 
includes free movement of persons, some agricultural trade, technical barriers to trade, government 
procurement, land transport, air transport and research. Bilateral Ι entered into force in 2002, and 
gradually removed tariffs on trade in primary agricultural products. Bilateral Agreement II between 
Switzerland and the EU was signed in 2004. It covers the Schengen5/Dublin6 agreements, processed 
agricultural products, interest and taxation, antifraud, the environment, statistics, film promotion and 
pensions. Bilateral Agreements I and II allow Switzerland to access part of the EU’s Single Market. 
Switzerland has achieved a similar level of goods market integration with the EU as EEA countries 
through its EFTA membership and the bilateral agreements (Dhingra & Sampson, 2017). 
Switzerland has a highly protected agricultural sector. With regards to agricultural trade, the EU and 
Switzerland have two sectoral trade agreements regulating trade in agri-food products. The EU-
Switzerland Agricultural Agreement (also named Agreement between the European Community and 
the Swiss Confederation on trade in agricultural products), is one of the seven sectoral agreements 
under Bilateral I covering primary agricultural products since 2002. Under this agreement, tariffs are 
reduced on fruits and vegetables, horticulture, meat and wine. In particular, trade in cheese between 
Switzerland and the EU has been completely liberalised since 2007. The agreement also reduces or 
eliminates non-tariff barriers (NTBs) arising due to regulatory differences. For example, regulations in 
the areas of plant health, animal feed, seeds, organic farming, wine, fruit and vegetable have been 
mutually recognised as being equivalent between the EU and Switzerland (Schweizerische 
Eidgenossenschaft, 2016; Copenhagen Economics, 2016).  
The Agreement on Processed Agricultural Products under Bilateral II liberalises a large amount of trade 
in processed agri-food products between the EU and Switzerland since 2005. The EU has no customs 
duties on a range of agri-food products imported from Switzerland such as chocolate and biscuits. In 
return, Switzerland reduces customs duties on some imports from the EU (Schweizerische 
Eidgenossenschaft, 2016).  
Switzerland has limited market access in the Single Market with regard to the free movement of 
services (see Table 2.2). The EU and Switzerland have not reached a comprehensive trade agreement 
covering services. If the UK adopted the Swiss Option post-Brexit, the UK would need to negotiate a 
broader service agreement with the EU focusing on financial and business services.  
 
                                               
5 The Schengen Association Agreement facilitates both travel between Switzerland and the EU, by lifting checks 
on people at the internal borders, and improves international justice and policy cooperation in the fight against 
crime (European Commission, 2018). 
6 The Dublin Association Agreement ensures that an asylum application is only examined by one state within the 
Dublin Area. The Dublin Area includes all EU Member States. The Dublin criteria establish which state is 
responsible for dealing with an application. They prevent asylum seekers from being sent from one country to 
another and, when their first application for asylum has been denied, from submitting a new one in another 






Similar to Norway, Switzerland accepts most EU economic regulations and has very limited influence 
over the planning or shaping of the EU rules which it complies with. Like the EEA countries, Switzerland 
makes payment to the EU budget to cover the programmes it participates in.  
If the UK adopted the Swiss Option, there would be less economic integration between the UK and the 
EU than with the EEA membership and the UK would have to follow EU rules to participate in the Single 
Market (Dhingra & Sampson, 2016).  
Another disadvantage of the Swiss Option would be that the UK would leave the Customs Union, as a 
consequence UK exporters would face increased trade transaction costs due to customs checks. In 
addition, the UK would have to comply with customs and rules of origins when trading with the EU 
(Dhingra & Sampson, 2016).  
Busch & Matthes (2016) noted that the Swiss Option is unpopular in the EU, as the Bilateral 
Agreements between the EU and Switzerland were initially negotiated as an interim solution before 
EU-accession of Switzerland. Thus, it would be a question that whether the EU is willing to accept a 
similar relationship with the UK.  
Table 2.2: The relationship between Switzerland and the EU.  
Included in Swiss FTA and bilateral/Swiss access to EU markets Not included in EU deals 
Goods:  
No import, export duties or quotas for industrial products; 
Some agricultural products (processed food); Trade facilitation 
and technical cooperation. 
Cross-border financial services 
Energy and climate policy 





External trade policy 
Foreign policy 
Services: Limited cross-border provision of services for a 
maximum of 90 days per year under the terms of the free 
movement of persons agreement (excluding employment 
agencies and financial services) 
Capital: Non-life insurers have the freedom to establish 
operations in one another's territory 
Persons: Free movement of persons: Social security; 
Recognition of professional qualifications 
Other areas: Public procurement; Research; Overland 
transport; Air transport; Member of Schengen border-free area; 
Participants in 'Dublin system' for asylum claims; Taxation of 
savings; Fight against fraud; MEDIA programme. 
“Cooperation agreements”: Membership of European 
Environment agency  
and EUROSTAT; education, vocational training and youth; 
Cooperation with Eurojust and Europol; Cooperation between 
competition authorities; European Asylum Support Office 








2.3 World Trade Organisation (WTO) Option/ Most Favoured Nation Principle  
 
The WTO Option is also often called the No-Deal Option. It refers to the case if the UK does not reach 
a trade agreement with the EU by 31st October 2019, then by default, the UK will have to comply with 
the WTO rules of trade with the EU and third countries, including countries that currently have trade 
deals with the EU.  
Since 2016 the WTO has 164 members comprising all major and most minor economies. The WTO rules 
require each member must grant the same “most-favoured-nation” (MFN)7 market access, which 
means charging the same tariffs, to all other WTO members (except countries that chose to enter into 
free trade agreements, such as the EU, EEA or EFTA, and they can give preferential market access to 
developing countries) (see Table 2.3) (WTO, 2018).  
Under the WTO Option the UK would lose its tariff-free market access to the EU Single Market and 
default to the WTO tariffs for all imports. Clearly, the imposition of tariffs on EU-UK trade would 
increase trade costs for both importers and exporters (Dhingra et al. 2017). These increases can be 
divided into three parts: (1) higher tariffs on imports; (2) higher non-tariff barriers (NTBs) to trade 
(arising from different regulations, border controls, etc.); and (3) the UK will not participate in future 
steps that the EU takes towards deeper integration and the further reduction of non-tariff barriers 
within the EU (Dhingra et al., 2016).  
The UK’s trade in services would also have to comply with the WTO rules, including the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), and the Trade in Services Agreement (TISA). Booth et al. (2015) 
noted that the EU’s Single Market for trade in services is more liberalised than the WTO. This implies 
that the WTO membership would reduce access to EU markets for UK service producers. One of the 
advantages of WTO Option might be that the UK would stop making financial contribution to the EU 
budget. 
With regards to agricultural trade policy, under the WTO Option, the UK would no longer be subject to 
the EU CAP. This would remove the current level of subsides and the support that the agricultural 
sector receives under the CAP. These would be replaced by UK agricultural policy. UK- EU agricultural 
trade would be subject to tariffs for agricultural products under the WTO Agreement on Agriculture. 
Also, the UK’s approach to agricultural subsidies would come under WTO scrutiny (Swinbank, 2017). 
As mentioned above, under the WTO Option, import tariffs and various controls would be imposed on 
trade between the UK and the EU, with impacts concentrated on agriculture and other industries that 
depend on products that repeatedly cross between the UK and the rest of the EU. The average import 
duty for agricultural goods that the EU (and, for now, the UK) charges is 8.7 per cent, however duties 
exceed 25 per cent for more than one in ten agricultural products. The highest tariff rates are in fact 
way above 25 per cent — the equivalent of 189 per cent for some dairy products and 116 per cent for 
some animal products. For processed food, the tariff rates are very complex, for example they could 
already change by reducing the sugar content in a product. Those rates do not apply to imports under 
free trade agreements or preferences for developing countries (the Generalised Scheme of 
                                               
7 MFN treatment requires the WTO members to accord the most favourable tariff and regulatory treatment given 





Preferences (GSP)), but under the ‘no deal scenario’ they would have to apply to trade between the 
UK and the EU. Hence, under the WTO Option the impact on agri-food trade would likely be significant 
(Ungphakorn, 2017). 
In addition, the EU and the UK would have to determine their respective shares of the EU’s tariff rate 
quotas (TRQs). TRQs are important in respect to the agricultural sector, as it is where each WTO 
member’s TRQs allow certain quantities of agricultural products to enter the market duty-free or at a 
rate below the bound rate. Downes (2017) has emphasised that “splitting” TRQs between the EU and 
the remaining EU27 is challenging. This is because the EU’s reallocation of the TRQs would be open to 
negotiation by the WTO members.  
A particular example is the country specific quota for NZ lamb imports into the EU which is currently 
set at 230,000 tonnes. Inside this quota, imports are duty free. However, outside this quota, a mixed 
tariff is charged which is up to 12.8 per cent of the price, plus up to €902 - €3,118 per tonne. The UK 
and the EU have jointly proposed to the WTO that their quotas should be split in a way that keeps the 
same total. The UK and EU requested that the share each country gets should be in proportion to the 
percentages of averages of 2013-15 EU trade data. For NZ lamb, this resulted in a 50:50 split - about 
115,000 tonnes in each quota. However, NZ and a number of other countries have complained about 
this method as it weakens the trading rights they negotiated in the WTO because it reduces the 
commercial value of the quota. Also, partitioning the quotas in the proposed way would limit the 
flexibility of exporting countries to choose between exporting to the UK or another EU country where 
it might be more profitable. While the UK is a member of the EU, NZ can choose to export to any EU 
country where the prices are more profitable (Ungphakorn, 2017).  
Table 2.3: A Summary of the WTO Option. 
Included/Access to EU markets Not included 
Goods: MFN treatment  Free movement of people 
 Cross-border financial services 
 Social and employment policy 
 Energy and climate policy 
 Consumer rights 
 Agricultural policy 
 Fisheries policy 
 Regional policy 
 External trade policy 
 Foreign policy 
Services: Under the GATS, UK companies selling services 
through subsidiaries should not be discriminated against. 
Capital: The TRIMs (Trade Related Investment Measures) is 
designed to avoid trade distorting effects of investments in 
the goods trade. 
The OECD's "Code of liberalisation of Capital Movements" 
includes legally binding rule on non-discrimination on capital 
flows. 
People: The Uruguay trade round added liberalising 
measures on intra-company transferees regarded as 
"essential personnel" and business visitors. 
Other: Agreement on Government Procurement - a 
plurilateral deal on opening up of government procurement 
market 








A summary of the three alternatives for the UK after leaving the EU and their potential consequences 
are presented in Table 2.4. Overall, the Norway and Swiss Options would give the UK certain level of 
preferential market access to the EU Single Market. However, the UK would face a greater level of EU 
regulations under the Norway and Swiss Options. Under the WTO Option, the UK would regain full 
regulatory sovereignty while it would trade with the EU under the WTO rules. However, the table 
below excluded the impact on agriculture so whilst the Norwegian and Swiss options allow more access 
to the EU this is not necessarily the case for agriculture. 
Table 2.4: Possible alternatives to EU membership and their consequences for the UK. 
  Norway/EEA Switzerland WTO 
Decision-making rights and representation in the 
EU 
No No No 
Customs Union No No No 
Tariffs on the UK exports to the EU No No Yes 
Single Market Free movement of goods Yes Partial No 
Free movement of 
persons 
Yes No No 
Free movement of capital Yes No No 
Free movement of 
services 
Yes Partial No, GATS 
Rules 
Renegotiation of FTAs Yes Yes Yes 
Increased trade costs due to RoO Yes Yes Yes 
Cost of customs clearance Yes Yes No 
Regulatory autonomy Limited Limited Yes 
Influence on EU Regulation Very limited No No 
Financial Contributions Yes, partial Yes, partial No 
Source: Busch & Matthes, (2016). 
In the following two chapters studies and reports are presented that analyse the impact of different 
exit scenarios and assumptions on the UK’s economy and trade (Chapter 3) and especially on the 








Effects of Brexit on the UK’s Economy and Trade 
This chapter presents the literature that examined the economic impacts of a withdrawal of the United 
Kingdom (UK) from the European Union (EU). These studies and reports have attempted to quantify 
the economic impact of a Brexit on the UK using different scenarios and assumptions.  
Various studies have been conducted to estimate the economic impact of the UK leaving the EU on the 
UK’s economy with the majority of studies projecting a significant impact on the UK’s economy from 
Brexit. The HM Treasury (2016) estimated the long-term economic impact of Brexit on the UK’s 
economic growth by 2030 using a gravity modelling approach. Three different scenarios were modelled 
(1) the EEA membership (Norway Option); (2) a negotiated bilateral agreement (FTA/Swiss Option); 
and (3) WTO membership (WTO Option). Results showed that leaving the EU under all three options 
would have different degrees of negative impact on the UK’s economy by 2030 (see Table 3.1). Among 
the three options, the WTO membership would be the alternative with the most long-term negative 
impact on the UK’s economy. The findings showed that relying on WTO rules would result in a 
significant reduction in the UK’s GDP by 2030 (decrease between 5.4 per cent and 9.5 per cent). This 
is equivalent to a loss of £5,200 per annum per UK household over the long-term. In comparison, under 
the EEA membership Option, the total loss was estimated between 3.4 per cent and 4.3 per cent of 
GDP by 2030. This loss of GDP is equivalent to £1,100 less per year for each household. The HM 
Treasury (2016) noted leaving the EU to join the EEA would maintain substantial access to the EU Single 
Market. However, the introduction of customs borders with the EU would increase trade transaction 
costs.  
Under the FTA Option (Swiss Option), the HM Treasury (2016) predicted that the UK’s GDP would fall 
between 4.6 per cent and 7.8 per cent by 2030. This is equivalent to a loss of £1,100 per year for each 
household. The HM Treasury (2016) suggested that the FTA Option provides less access to the Single 
Market when compared to the EEA membership Option.  
Table 3.1: Annual impact of Brexit on the UK in 2030. 
  EEA Scenario FTA Scenario WTO Scenario 
GDP level (%)- central -3.8 -6.2 -7.5 
GDP level (%) -3.4 to -4.3 -4.6 to -7.8 -5.4 to -9.5 
GDP per capita - central -£1,100 -£1,800 -£2,100 
GDP per capita  -£1,000 to -£1,200 -£1,300 to -£2,200 -£1,500 to –£2,700 
GDP per household -central -£2,600 -£4,300 -£5,200 
GDP per household  -£2,400 to -£2,900 -£3,200 to -£5,400 -£3,700 to -£6,600 
Net impact on receipts -£20 billion -£36 billion -£45 billion 







Overall, the HM Treasury (2016) concluded that their economic analysis showed that all options 
increased the economic costs for the UK. The UK would have to negotiate new trade agreements with 
the EU to have preferential access to the Single Market. The analysis further showed that in all options 
trade transaction costs were increased between the UK and the EU. Combined, the reduced access to 
the Single Market and increased trade transaction costs would potentially make the UK a less attractive 
destination for foreign investment. Lastly, with all options the UK would not be able to benefit from 
the EU’s FTAs with third countries. Hence, the UK’s access to global markets might be reduced as the 
UK would have to renegotiate FTAs with third countries (HM Treasury, 2016).  
In their study, PwC (2016) applied a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model to analyse the 
potential economic impacts of leaving the EU on the UK in 2020, 2025 and 2030, respectively. Two 
scenarios were analysed; these were (1) FTA scenario, i.e. the UK exits and negotiates a free trade 
agreement with the EU, based on tariff-free trade in goods (but not services). The UK would have to 
implement EU standards on goods supplied to the EU, but otherwise would not be bound by the four 
freedoms of the Single Market; and (2) WTO scenario, where no agreement is made and the UK trades 
at WTO tariff levels. Results are shown in Table 3.2. It can be seen that by 2020, the UK GDP would 
drop by 0.3 per cent in the FTA scenario and by 5.5 per cent in the WTO scenario. In 2030, UK GDP 
would decrease by 1.2 per cent in the FTA scenario and by 3.5 per cent in the WTO scenario. With 
regards to trade impacts, the study showed that trade between the UK and the EU in 2020 would drop 
by 0.5 per cent and 1.7 per cent in the FTA and WTO scenarios, respectively, compared to the UK 
remaining a member of the EU. The UK’s trade with the EU would decrease by 2.1 per cent in the WTO 
scenario in 2030.  
Table 3.2: Results of the PwC study (percentage change). 
  
FTA scenario WTO scenario 
2020 2025 2030 2020 2025 2030 
Trade  –0.5 –0.5 –0.5 -1.7 -1.9 -2.1 
Total impact on GDP -0.31 -1.1 -1.2 -5.5 -4.1 -3.5 
Impact on GDP per Capita -3 -0.9 -0.8 -5.4 -3.6 -2.7 
Source: PwC, (2016). 
In a similar study, Booth et al. (2015) assessed the economic impact of the UK leaving the EU on the 
UK’s economy using a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model. The authors simulated four 
possible scenarios for the UK-EU relations after Brexit in 2030. These scenarios were (1) WTO scenario; 
(2) FTA 1: comprehensive FTA between EU and UK; (3) FTA 2: UK – EU FTA and Unilateral Free Trade 
with the rest of the world; (4) UK - EU FTA no financial contribution to EU budget, deregulation of UK 
economy and opening up almost fully to trade with the rest of the world. Table 3.3 shows that in the 
WTO scenario in 2030 UK GDP would decrease by 2.2 per cent which equals to a welfare loss of £55.52 
billion. In the FTA 1 scenario, UK GDP was estimated to drop by 0.8 per cent by 2030. In contrast, in 
the FTA 2 scenario UK GDP would increase 0.6 per cent by 2030 and even further by 1.6 per cent in the 







Table 3.3: Impacts on UK of Brexit on Real GDP and Welfare.  
 Worst case Brexit: 
WTO scenario 
UK-EU FTA (1) UK-EU FTA (2) 
Brexit best case: 
UK-EU FTA 




-2.23 -55.52 -0.81 -22.12 0.64 8.78 1.55 34.78 
Source: Booth et al., (2015).  
In their study, Dhingra et al. (2017) used a general equilibrium trade model to examine the economic 
costs and benefits of Brexit under two scenarios: (1) a ‘soft Brexit’ (the Norway Option) and (2) a ‘hard 
Brexit’ (the WTO Option). Results on welfare effects showed that leaving the EU would reduce the 
welfare of British citizens in both scenarios. As shown in Table 3.4, the total welfare change in the ‘soft 
Brexit’ scenario was estimated at -1.3 per cent (which equals a loss of -£25.1 bn in GDP or -£893 income 
loss per household) and at -2.7 per cent (which equals -£49.8bn in GDP or -£1,773 income loss per 
household) in the ‘hard Brexit’ scenario.  
Table 3.4: Impact of Brexit on living standards in different regions. 
 Soft Brexit Hard Brexit 
 Change in % 
welfare 
Change in GDP 
(£bn) 




UK -1.34 -25.1 -2.66 -49.8 
All EU countries except UK -0.14 -12.3 -0.35  
Non-EU countries 0.01 3.7 0.02 7.4 
Source: Dhingra et al., (2017). 
 












Short run -5 -6 -14 -13 
Long run -9 -8 -25 -22 
Hard Brexit 
scenario 
Short run -14 -14 -36 -34 
Long run -16 -16 -43 -38 
Source: Dhingra et al., (2017). 
With regards to UK trade flows after Brexit (see Table 3.5), Dhingra et al. (2017) found that in the ‘soft 
Brexit’ scenario, total UK exports would decrease by 5 per cent in the short run (1 year after Brexit) 
and by 9 per cent in long run (10 years after Brexit). Moreover, UK exports to the EU would fall by 14 
per cent in the short run, and by 25 per cent in the long run. In the ‘hard Brexit’ scenario, total UK 





The UK’s exports to the EU would drop by 36 per cent in the short run, and 43 per cent in the long run, 
respectively.  
Dhingra et al. (2017) concluded that the economic consequences of Brexit will depend on the future 
of UK-EU trade relations. However, the results of two alternatives showed that leaving the EU would 
lower UK – EU trade because of reduced integration with EU countries.  
Finally, Table 3.4 shows also that countries outside the EU may gain from Brexit, although the numbers 
are very close to zero. This is because of trade diversion effects due to the fact that the UK partially 
switches from trading with the EU to trading with non-EU countries (which in turn benefit from more 
trade with the UK) (Dhingra et al., 2017). 
In another study, Figus et al. (2018) used a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model to examine 
the long-term economic impact of Brexit on Scotland and the rest of UK (RUK). The authors considered 
the FTA and the WTO scenarios for UK-EU interactions post-Brexit. Results showed a substantial 
reduction in trade between Scotland and the EU for goods and services under both FTA and WTO 
scenarios. In the WTO scenario, total export prices were projected to decrease by 0.6 per cent in the 
short run, 3.2 per cent after 5 years, 6.7 per cent after 10 years and 8.3 per cent in long run. Scottish 
export prices of goods to the EU were projected to fall 5.1 per cent in the short run, 25.7 per cent after 
5 years, 50.5 per cent in 10 years and 51.8 per cent in the long run. Figus et al. (2018) pointed out the 
reduction in export prices is obviously due to the imposition of the tariff on Scottish goods exported 
to the EU.  
In terms of the results under the FTA scenario, Figus et al. (2018) reported that the total export prices 
would drop by 0.2 per cent in short run and 6.1 per cent in long run. Scottish export prices of goods to 
the EU were projected to decrease by 4.1 per cent in short run, 39.3 per cent in long run. In addition, 
the import prices of goods from the EU were projected to drop by 5.2 per cent and 37.3 per cent in 
short run and long run.  
In their study, Boulanger & Philippidis (2015) used a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model to 
model scenarios with the assumptions of nationalisation of the UK’s payments to the EU, a free trade 
agreement with the EU and adoption of the existing EU external tariff on non-EU trade. Under the UK-
EU FTA scenario, model projections indicated a small real income gain for the UK (i.e. 0.6 per cent of 
per capita GDP) which is generated by increases in (tariffed) imports of non-EU origin. However, this 
would turn into a loss of 0.7 per cent of UK per capita real income under conditions of higher assumed 
trade transaction costs arising from the loss of Single Market access.  
In their study, Mion & Ponattu (2019) assessed the economic impact of Brexit on European countries 
and regions using a general equilibrium trade model. In two different scenarios – a soft and hard Brexit 
- Mion & Ponattu (2019) examined impacts on productivity, markups, product variety, welfare and the 
distribution of population across European countries and regions. Results showed that Brexit in general 
– hard or soft – was projected to have a significant, but regionally varying, impact on welfare. The UK 
was projected to experience the most significant impact from the UK leaving the EU. Aggregate welfare 
losses in the hard Brexit scenario were projected to amount to 57 billion Euros annually (-873 Euros 
per capita). In a soft Brexit scenario, the aggregate welfare loss was projected to amount to 32 billion 
Euros for the UK (-500 Euros per capita). With regards to the other countries, the welfare losses were 






Table 3.6: Welfare income loss in selected European Countries. 
Income Loss 
in billion Euros 
Soft Brexit Hard Brexit 
1 Great Britain 32.26 57.34 
2 Germany 5.27 9.5 
3 France 4.29 7.73 
4 Italy 2.28 4.12 
5 Ireland 1.87 3.41 
6 Netherlands 1.75 3.16 
7 Spain 1.73 3.12 
8 Belgium 0.94 1.69 
9 Sweden 0.79 1.43 
10 Switzerland 0.74 1.34 
          Source: Mion & Ponattu, (2019). 
To conclude, a large number of studies have been conducted to estimate the economic impact of the 
UK leaving the EU on the UK’s economy. The majority of these projected a negative impact on the UK’s 
economy from Brexit with a projected reduction of GDP and loss in household income with amounts 
varying between different scenarios. The exception being when it is assumed the UK can cease 
payments to the EU and yet continue tariff free access and current tariff levels with the rest of the 
world, a rather unrealistic scenario. The studies further showed that these welfare impacts vary 













Impacts of Brexit on Agriculture and Trade in the UK and Elsewhere  
A few studies have assessed the potential effects of the UK exiting the EU on agriculture and trade 
using different scenarios and assumptions. In their study, Davis et al. (2017) analysed the impact of 
three different Brexit trade scenarios on seven UK agricultural commodities (beef, sheep, pigs, poultry, 
milk & dairy, wheat and barley) using a partial equilibrium modelling framework: the FAPRI-UK model8 
in combination with the FAPRI-EU model (GOLD)9. The scenarios were (1) Bespoke Free Trade 
Agreement with the EU; (2) WTO Default; and (3) Unilateral Trade Liberalisation. Results from each 
scenario were compared to the baseline in 2025 that assumed that the UK remains in the EU. Table 
4.1 outlines the three trade scenarios in more detail. In addition, the MFN tariffs applied in WTO 
default scenario are presented in Table 1.1 of the Appendix. Further, the authors assumed that the UK 
inherits the EU’s tariff structure to third countries in terms of exports from the UK to the rest of the 
world. In addition, TRQs applied by the UK from third countries are retained. TRQs for the UK are 
calculated based on the average level of imports from the rest of world in the last five years.  
Table 4.1: Trade scenario definitions. 
Bespoke Free Trade 
Agreement  
with the EU (Scenario 1) 
WTO Default 
(Scenario 2) 
Unilateral Trade Liberalisation 
(Scenario 3) 
 UK retains tariff 
and quota free 
access to the EU 
and EU retains 
tariff and quota 
free access to the 
UK 
 UK maintains EU 
tariff structure to 
rest of the world 
 5% trade 
facilitation costs on 
UK-EU27 trade 
 MFN tariffs applied to 
imports from the EU 
 TRQs from third countries 
retained 
 MFN tariffs applied to UK 
exports destined for the 
EU 
 No changes in tariff 
structure for exports to 
the rest of the world 
 8% trade facilitation costs 
on UK-EU27 trade 
 Zero tariffs applied on 
imports to the UK from 
both the EU and the rest 
of the world 
 MFN tariffs applied to the 
UK exports destined for 
the EU 
 No change in tariff 
structure for exports to 
the rest of the world 
 8% trade facilitation costs 
on UK-EU27 trade 
Source: Davis et al., (2017). 
 
Overall, the authors estimated that the changes to product prices, production and trade were relatively 
smaller in the FTA scenario, than in the WTO default scenario and in the Unilateral Trade Liberalisation 
scenario (see Table 1.2 to 1.4 in the Appendix). The imposition of MFN tariffs in the WTO default 
                                               
8 This model was developed by Agri-Food and Biosciences Institute (AFBI-Economics). 





scenario would lead to significant adjustments in trade between the UK and the remaining EU 
countries. In turn, these changes in trade would have a significant impact on the domestic market, 
prices of all commodities were projected to decline in the unilateral trade liberalisation scenario. Davis 
et al. (2017) suggested that domestic productivity and competitiveness under the trade liberalisation 
scenario would have to be improved urgently, as producers would be much more exposed to direct 
competition with international suppliers.  
In more detail, results showed that in the Bespoke FTA scenario commodity prices were projected to 
increase due to the higher trade transaction costs. As shown in Table 1.2 to 1.4 in the Appendix, UK 
prices were projected to grow for commodities in which the UK is a net importer, such as beef (+3 per 
cent) and cheese (+1 per cent). In contrast, UK prices were projected to drop for commodities in which 
the UK is a net exporter, such as barley (-1 per cent) and sheepmeat (-1 per cent).  
In the WTO default scenario, results showed that the impact of Brexit on the selected commodities 
varied by sector. In the UK beef sector, the implementation of high MFN tariffs on beef products had 
significant impact on beef trade flows between the UK and the remaining EU countries. As a result, the 
UK beef price was projected to increase by 17 per cent by 2025. Similarly, prices for pigmeat and 
poultry were projected to increase by 18 per cent and 15 per cent, respectively. Similarly, results for 
dairy commodities showed that UK cheese and butter prices were projected to increase by 29 per cent 
and 43 per cent, respectively compared to the baseline in 2025. In contrast, sheepmeat prices were 
projected to decrease by 18 per cent by 2025 (Davis, et al, 2017).  
With regards to trade, Davis et al. (2017) found that in the WTO scenario UK crop exports to the EU 
were projected to fall by 2025, with wheat exports projected to collapse entirely and barley exports 
falling by 80 per cent. Also, UK cheese imports from the EU were projected to fall significantly, while 
butter imports from the EU were projected to collapse completely. 
Under the Unilateral Trade Liberalisation scenario, Davis et al. (2017) indicated that the elimination of 
tariff barriers would have an overall negative impact on UK prices across all commodities. Producer 
prices were projected to fall significantly in beef (-45 per cent) and sheep (-29 per cent), and more 
moderately in pigs (-12 per cent), milk & dairy (-10 per cent), poultry (-9 per cent), barley (-7 per cent) 
and wheat (-5 per cent).  
Bellora et al. (2017) applied the MIRAGE model10 to estimate the impact of Brexit on the EU-UK 
agricultural trade. In their study, the impacts of three different WTO trade scenarios on 19 agri-food 
industries, 14 manufacturing sectors, 8 services sectors and 35 geographical areas were modelled. The 
scenarios were (1) the WTO scenario”, which applies WTO rules for EU-UK trade, as well as trade 
between the UK and non-EU countries. In this scenario, Bellora et al. (2017) assumed that tariffs and 
non-tariff-measures (NTMs) would be imposed on bilateral agricultural trade between the UK and the 
EU, and between the UK and Turkey. (2) WTO (Tariff Only) scenario which uses bilateral tariffs up to 
MFN level between the UK and EU, no NTMs; (3) WTO (Ireland NTM) scenario which assumed that 
Ireland would face higher Ad Valorem Equivalent (AVE) for NTMs when trading with the EU after Brexit. 
Tariff and NTM shocks were introduced in 2021 and projected out to 2030. 
                                               
10 The MIRAGE model is a recursive-dynamic computable general equilibrium model designed for trade policy 






Results showed that there was a large decrease in EU27-UK agri-good trade flows in the WTO scenario. 
In this scenario, European agri-food exports to the UK were projected to decrease by 62 per cent. Some 
agri-food exports from the EU to the UK, such as rice, white meat, sugar, dairy and red meat were 
projected to almost completely collapse, falling by over 90 per cent by 2030. In contrast, in the WTO 
Tariff only scenario, Bellora et al. (2017) found that the impacts of Brexit on the EU27-UK agri-food 
products were almost halved with the exception of red meat (and sugar and dairy products to a smaller 
extent). For those sectors, the WTO tariff only scenario was projected to have almost the same impact 
than the WTO scenario. The authors explained that for these sectors protection comes mainly from 
the MFN tariff, not from NTMs. Results further showed that direct impacts on European agri-food 
exports to UK were offset by increased exports to all other trading partners. 
With regards to EU sub-regions, Bellora et al. (2017) identified that Ireland, the Netherlands and France 
were projected to lose the most in terms of trade by volume among the EU states. For example, results 
showed that Ireland’s exports to the UK were projected to decrease 70 per cent by volume. Exports 
from the Netherlands and France to the UK were projected to fall by 66 per cent and 51 per cent by 
volume, respectively. Bellora et al. (2017) pointed out that the significant decrease in these countries 
was due to these countries having large volumes of exports to the UK. 
The study concluded that for the majority of sectors, the impact of NTMs is nearly twice that of the 
tariffs and hence drives the impacts on trade, with the exception of red meat, sugar and dairy. 
Therefore, the implementation of MFN tariffs on trade between the UK and the EU27 would have a 
negative impact on bilateral trade between the two countries. In addition, the increase in both NTMs 
and tariffs would have stronger impacts on bilateral trade between the UK and the EU27 compared to 
only increasing tariffs (Bellora et al., 2017). 
In their study, Jongeneel et al. (2016) used the partial equilibrium model - AGMEMOD model, to 
analyse the impact of Brexit on British agriculture and the food sector. Nine agricultural products were 
selected in their study: soft wheat, barley, oilseeds, sugar, beef, pork, poultry, sheep and raw milk. 
Jongeneel et al. (2016) combined three agricultural supports and three trade options into nine 
agricultural policy and trade scenarios. The options of agricultural support considered in their study 
included: firstly, retention of 100 per cent of the current level of direct payments to UK famers; 
secondly, reduction of these payments from 100 per cent to 50 per cent; and thirdly, complete 
elimination of direct payments. The three trade scenarios in their study were (1) UK-EU FTA, (2) Default 








Table 4.2: Overview of trade scenarios. 
  Agricultural policy scenario 
Trade policy  
scenario 
FTA between  
EU and UK 
(FTA) 
100% Direct 
Payment (DP);  
5%  trade 
facilitation costs 
(TFC) 
50% DP;  
5% TFC 




100% DP;  
8% TFC 
50% DP;  
8% TFC 
No DP; 
 8% TFC 
UK Trade  
Liberalisation 
(UK TL) 
100% DP;  
8% TFC 
50% DP;  
8% TFC 
No DP;  
8% TFC 
Source: Jongeneel et al., (2016). 
Under the FTA and Default WTO scenarios, results indicated that the average producer prices would 
increase 4.5 and 8.3 per cent, respectively (see Figure 4-1). Correspondingly, the UK’s domestic 
production was projected to grow in the FTA and Default WTO scenarios. Due to the loss of the UK’s 
access to EU preferential imports, producer prices for sheep meat, poultry meat, butter, cheese and 
sugar were projected to increase by 4.2, 0.3, 0.8, 0.3 and 3.8 per cent, respectively. Jongeneel et al. 
(2016) noted that the increased producer prices would be positive for the producers, however, in turn, 
this would have a negative impact on the UK’s domestic consumers in the two scenarios.  
Figure 4.1: Percentage price changes for selected crops and animal products.  
 
Source: Jongeneel et al., (2016).  
In addition, Jongeneel et al. (2016) showed that the UK Trade Liberalisation scenario was expected to 
have a significant negative impact on producer prices for all animal products (except for raw milk) and 
sugar. In particular, the beef price was projected to decline by 15 per cent. In contrast, producer prices 






In a different study, Van Berkum et al. (2016) analysed the effects of Brexit on British agriculture at 
country/EU level and at farm-level using the AGMEMOD modelling approach. In their study, 12 
commodities were selected and analysed; these were soft wheat, barley, rapeseed, sugar, beef, pork, 
poultry, sheepmeat, butter, cheese, skim milk powder and whole milk powder. The authors considered 
three trade policy scenarios in the event of a Brexit (see Table 4.3 for more detail): (1) UK-EU FTA 
scenario, (2) WTO-default scenario, and (3) UK trade liberalisation scenario.  
Table 4.3: Overview of scenarios.  
Name/label of 
scenarios 
Agricultural policy assumptions 
No changes in Rural Development Policy plus …   
100% Direct payments (DP) 50% DP No DP 
Baseline Benchmark (existing CAP applies) Not considered Not considered 
FTA between UK 
and EU 
FTA+100%DP FTA+50%DP FTA+0%DP 
WTO default 
position 
WTO+100%DP WTO+50%DP WTO+0%DP 
UK Trade 
Liberalisation 
UK TL+100% DP UK TL+50%DP UK TL+0%DP 
Source: Van Berkum et al. (2016). 
 
Results showed that in the FTA scenario, prices for all selected agricultural products were projected to 
increase. Growth ranged from 2.3 per cent to 5.5 per cent. Correspondingly, these higher prices were 
projected to increase production of these agricultural products, as shown in Table 1.5 in the Appendix.  
Similarly, in the WTO default scenario, prices for agricultural product were projected to increase 
(ranging from +7.2 to +11.5 per cent) (see Table 1.6 in the Appendix). Due to these price increases, 
production of most products was projected to grow, except for eggs and cheese production which 
were projected to decrease by 1.3 per cent and 0.2 per cent, respectively (Van Berkum et al., 2016).  
In the UK Trade Liberalisation scenario the impacts on prices differ over the commodities, as shown in 
Table 1.7 in the Appendix. In general, the impact on crop prices (except for sugar) was small reflecting 
the fact that current EU prices are already similar to world prices. Sugar and animal products (meats 
and dairy products) still have a much higher degree of protection. Therefore, halving the import tariffs 
for these products would lead to significant price drops for these products, such as 18 and 19 per cent 
for beef and sheep meat, respectively. 
In a follow-on study, Van Berkum et al. (2018) assessed the impacts of two Brexit scenarios on Dutch 
agricultural trade flows, using the AGMEMOD modelling approach. The scenarios were (1) EU – UK 
Free Trade Agreement, including 5 per cent trade transaction costs and (2) WTO default scenarios, the 
UK applies MFN tariffs, including 8 per cent trade transaction costs. Results from the EU – UK FTA 
scenario showed that Dutch exports to the UK and the rest of the world were projected to be affected 
only marginally. In contrast, the WTO scenario was projected to have a greater, but still relatively 





market. Results further showed that the value of agricultural production in the Netherlands was 
projected to decline by around 2 per cent due to prices dropping (as a result of price pressure in the 
EU market as a consequence of Brexit‐related trade distortions). The authors pointed out that potential 
impacts of non‐tariff measures on trade costs were not included in the analysis.  
In their study, Hubbard et al (2018) used a Computable General Equilibrium Model, a Partial 
Equilibrium Model and Farm Level Models to analyse the impact of various trade and domestic policy 
scenarios after Brexit on the UK economy, and particularly on its agricultural sector. Three scenarios 
were developed, (1) UK–EU Free Trade Agreement (FTA); (2) Unilateral Trade Liberalisation (UTL); and 
(3) return to WTO tariffs (EU Tariffs Schedule - WTO).  
Results showed that Brexit was projected to have an overall negative impact on the UK Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP), however impacts were relatively small, as shown in Table 4.4. The largest impact was 
projected in the WTO scenario. Under the MFN tariff schedules UK GDP was projected to fall by 0.4 
per cent per annum on average, whereas in the UTL scenario UK GDP was projected to fall the least, 
at 0.22 per cent per annum on average (Hubbard et al., 2018).  
Table 4.4: CGE general effects on UK GDP, agri‐food output and prices, percentage changes to 





FTA  UTL WTO  
+DP -DP +DP -DP +DP -DP 
UK GDP (%)  -0.34 -0.33 -0.22 -0.22 -0.42 -0.41 
              
UK Production (%) 
Agriculture 0.4 -2.9 -0.9 -4.2 1.9 -1.1 
Food  0.4 -0.6 2 0.9 0.8 0 
-all meat (red and white)  2 -0.8 -11.8 -15 14.8 12.5 
              
UK Prices (%) 
Agriculture (farm gate)  0.1 3.3 -0.5 2.6 2 5.5 
-crops 0 2.6 0 2.3 1.2 4 
-livestock 0.1 3.7 -0.8 2.8 2.5 6.4 
Food retail prices  0.4 0.8 0 0.3 3.7 4.1 
-all meat (red and white)  1.1 2 -4.3 -3.6 7.3 8.3 
 Note: DP= Direct Payment  
 Source: Hubbard et al., (2018). 
In addition, in the WTO (+DP) scenario, UK farm gate prices for primary agriculture and retail prices for 
processed food were projected to increase. Compared to the baseline, prices in the meat sector and 
food processing were projected to increase by 7.3 per cent and 3.7 per cent, respectively. These price 
effects were consequences of the adjustment to WTO MFN tariffs on EU trade and the imposition of 





direct payments (WTO (-DP)) was projected to increase the equivalent per unit cost of agricultural 
production, resulting in further price increases (Hubbard et al., 2018). 
In the UK-EU FTA scenario projected impacts on the UK agricultural sector were relatively modest. In 
contrast, in the UTL scenario significant negative impacts on prices, production and incomes were 
projected. The adoption of the EU's WTO tariffs on imports favours net importers (e.g. dairy) and 
negatively affects net exporters (e.g. sheep).  
Hubbard et al. (2018) explain that given the strong dependence of most UK farms on direct payments, 
their removal worsens negative impacts of new trade arrangements and offsets positive 
impacts. These impacts vary across different types and farm sizes, but also regionally. However, the 
period of adjustment to new trade and domestic policy conditions may be very challenging for many 
farm businesses (Hubbard et al., 2018). 
In their study, Sik Choi et al. (2019) examined the impacts of three different Brexit scenarios on the 
UK’s agri-food sector using the agricultural sector model CAPRI. The three scenarios include increasing 
barriers to trade (1) EEA+, all tariffs on agricultural commodities removed, (2) EU-UK FTA including trade 
transaction costs, (3) WTO MFN tariff rates. Table 4.5 presents the three scenarios in more detail. 
Results were then compared to the baseline scenario in which the UK remains in the EU in 2030.  
Table 4.5: Brexit Scenarios. 
 
Soft Brexit Hard Brexit (No deal) 
  EEA+ FTA WTO 
NTBs 5.0% 7.9-12.7% 12.6% (for primary products) 
24.2% (for processed products) 
Tariff (UK-EU27) No tariffs No tariffs MFN tariffs 
UK's EU budget (CAP) 
contribution 
Yes No tariffs No 
TRQs historical level TRQs remain in the UK 
UK's trade with the ROW UK retains EU's FTAs with third countries 
Note: NTB costs are shown in ad-valorem equivalent tariff rates. 
Source: Sik Choi et al., (2019). 
Overall, results showed that Brexit has a much larger impact on trade patterns in the UK compared to 
the EU27. Even in the EEA+ scenario, UK exports were projected to drop by between 10 -25 per cent 
for all commodities due to the additional 5 per cent trade transaction costs. In the WTO scenario, 
cereals, meat and dairy exports were projected to fall by more than 60 per cent. In addition, imports 
to the UK were projected to drop in all product categories except for oilseeds (Sik Choi et al., 2019). 
Results further showed that UK producer prices for the majority of commodities were projected to 
increase; this was due to a drop in imports to the UK. In the EEA+ and FTA scenarios, projections of 
producer price changes were rather small (less than 5 per cent) for all commodities. The highest 
impacts were projected in the WTO scenario, where producer prices of meat and dairy products were 







In terms of welfare impacts from the three scenarios, Sik Choi et al. (2019) showed that in all scenarios, 
UK consumers (-12 to -125 €/capita) and producers in EU27 (income losses, -0.2 to -2.5 per cent) were 
affected. However, the authors pointed out that if trade costs were kept low, the termination of the 
contribution to the EU CAP and the gains to producers from higher food prices could offset the losses 
to consumers. In the EU, falling food prices would benefit consumers but would reduce farmers’ 
incomes (Sik Choi et al., 2019). 
In a recent study conducted by The Andersons Centre (2019), the impacts of two different Brexit 
scenarios on British beef and sheepmeat trade and the supply chain were examined. The scenarios 
were Brexit Deal (i.e. EU-UK FTA) and No Deal (WTO Default position). Results showed that under the 
Brexit Deal scenario the impact on trade was projected to be relatively small with slight decreases 
projected for beef and sheepmeat exports (1.1 per cent) from the UK to the EU27 due to non-tariff 
measures (see Appendix Table 1.8). In contrast, under the No Deal scenario projections indicated 
significant drops in beef and sheepmeat trade between the UK and the EU27 due to the imposition of 
tariffs, TRQs and a higher incidence of NTMs (see Appendix Table 1.9). Combined beef and sheepmeat 
exports to the EU were projected to fall by 92.5 per cent, with sheepmeat exports projected to be 
almost completely wiped out.  
Results on the impact on  prices to 2022 showed small decreases in the Brexit Deal scenario (-1 to -3 
per cent, respectively) while in the No Deal scenario sheepmeat prices were projected to drop by 24 
per cent and beef by 4 per cent. Combining the price and quantity effects, the overall impact on the 
value of domestically produced carcass meat output under a Brexit Deal was projected to fall by 1.7 
per cent while under the No Deal scenario the decline would increase by nearly ten-fold (-11.7 per 
cent) with sheepmeat output almost 31 per cent lower. (The Andersons Centre, 2019). 
In his study, Revell (2017) focussed on the issues surrounding EU28 Tariff Rate Quotas (TRQs) relating 
to the trade of livestock products between the UK and the EU post-Brexit. The author assumed that 
the EU and the UK would adopt their trade commitments through the WTO, which means the UK and 
the EU would have to set their own schedule of TRQs at the WTO. Hence, both the UK and EU would 
need to make a decision on splitting the current TRQs between them in case of Brexit. This would 
involve negotiating trade agreements not only between the remaining EU countries and the UK, but 
also with third country exporters regarding market access.  
Revell (2017) emphasised that the TRQs play a key role for the management and control of external 
competition in the EU28’s agri-food sector. These TRQs enable the EU to export agricultural products 
at reduced tariffs up to certain amounts. Currently, the EU has about 87 TRQs schemes for agricultural, 
food and beverage products, including dairy, beef, lamb, poultry meat, sugar, fruit and vegetables, 
compared to the 54 maintained by the US and 12 by Canada. These TRQs accounted 6 per cent of the 
EU’s agri-food imports in 2014 (Potton and Webb, 2017).  
Revell (2017) noted that there are numerous TRQ schemes for meat products, especially for beef and 
veal. The sheep and goat meat TRQ is simple when compared to the beef and veal. The TRQ for sheep 
and goat meat is almost 287,000 tonnes, with country-specific allocations, primarily for NZ (228,200 
tonnes), followed by Argentina and Australia. Nine TRQs are applied on chicken and turkey. In terms 
of the dairy sector, the EU has separate TRQs for specific types of cheese, with a total amount of 





between the EU-27 and the UK is unlikely to resolve the complex issue of access rights of third 
countries to both markets. He further noted that there is a potential need for reciprocal EU27 – UK 
TRQs after Brexit. He further suggested that the UK should negotiate its own TRQs with third countries 
in the long run. 
To conclude, a few studies have assessed the potential impact of the UK leaving the EU on the 
agricultural sector and trade using different scenarios and assumptions. These scenarios include FTA, 
WTO MFN tariffs, additional NTM at various ranges (trade transaction costs etc.) and UTL (Unilateral 
Trade Liberalisation). The literature showed mixed results from these studies/ scenarios depending on 
the assumptions. While some studies projected a positive impact on the UK agricultural sector with 
increased producer prices across the agricultural commodities (Davis et al, 2017; Jongeneel et al., 
2016; Van Berkum, 2016; Sik Choi et al., 2019), other studies projected price drops, especially for the 
beef and sheepmeat sector (The Andersons Centre, 2019; Davis et al., 2017). In contrast, a Unilateral 
Trade scenario (i.e. all UK import tariffs drop) showed significant negative impacts on prices, 
production and incomes across the UK agricultural sector (Jongeneel et al., 2016; Hubbard et al., 2018). 
Further, these studies have shown a decrease in bilateral agricultural trade between the UK and the 
EU with larger impacts on trade patterns in the UK compared to the EU27 but also affecting other EU 
member states, particularly Ireland (Bellora et al., 2017). In addition, the majority of studies/ scenarios 














This report reviewed existing literature of potential impacts of different scenarios of the United 
Kingdom (UK) leaving the European Union (EU) on 31st of October 2019. Several studies have assessed 
the potential effects of the UK exiting the EU on the UK agricultural sector using various scenarios and 
assumptions around different types of potential trade agreements between the EU and the UK.   
Three possible alternatives to EU membership after Brexit are widely cited. These are (1) the 
Norwegian Option, i.e. admission to the European Economic Area (EEA); (2) the Swiss Option, i.e. 
bilateral agreements with the EU; (3) the WTO/ No Deal Option where the UK’s trade relations with 
the EU would be organised according to the Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN) principle, which applies for 
all third countries where the EU does not have a preferential trade agreement. All of these options 
include new trade tariffs combined with changes in trade transaction costs as non-tariff barriers (with 
various ranges).  
A large number of studies have been conducted to estimate the economic impact of the UK leaving 
the EU on the UK’s economy. The majority of these projected a negative impact on the UK’s economy 
from Brexit with a projected reduction of GDP and loss in household income to varying degrees 
depending on the scenario assumptions and the type of trade agreement met with the EU (HM 
Treasury, 2016: PWC, 2016; Dhingra et al., 2017; Booth et al., 2015; Boulanger & Philippidis, 2015); 
Mion & Ponattu, 2019). The studies further showed that these welfare impacts vary regionally with 
welfare losses predicted to be stronger the closer a country is to the UK (Mion & Ponattu, 2019).  
At industry level, a few studies have assessed the potential effects of the UK exiting the EU on the UK 
agricultural sector. Results from these studies were mixed depending on the scenarios examined. 
While some studies projected a positive impact on the UK agricultural sector with increased producer 
prices across the agricultural commodities (Davis et al, 2017; Jongeneel et al., 2016; Van Berkum, 2016; 
Sik Choi et al., 2019), other studies projected price drops especially for the beef and sheepmeat sector 
(The Andersons Centre, 2019; Davis et al., 2017). In contrast, a Unilateral Trade scenario (i.e. all UK 
import tariffs drop) showed a significant negative impact on prices, production and incomes across the 
agricultural sector (Jongeneel et al., 2016; Hubbard et al., 2018). Further, these studies have shown a 
decrease in bilateral agricultural trade between the UK and the EU with larger impacts on trade 
patterns in the UK compared to the EU27 but also affecting other EU member states, particularly 
Ireland (Bellora et al., 2017). In addition, the majority of studies and scenarios predicted a negative 







To conclude, the UK’s exit from the EU will have a range of implications for these two regions and other 
countries worldwide. The nature and extent of its impacts will be determined by the terms under which 
the UK exits, hence the impact of Brexit is yet unknown. The limitation of trade with the EU due to 
higher trade barriers will likely benefit UK producers in the agricultural sector, however these benefits 
will come at a cost to consumers as they will face higher prices and rising food budgets. Conversely 
unilateral trade liberalisation would benefit consumers while reducing producer returns. The exact 










Allen, M. Downing, E., Edwards, T., Deaton, N., Semple, M. (2014). CAP Reform 2014–20: EU 
Agreement and Implementation in the UK and in Ireland (updated). RaISe paper 702-14, UK.  
Bellora, C., Emlinger, C., Rouré, J., and Guimbard, H. (2017). Research for AGRI Committee, EU-UK 
agricultural trade: state of play and possible impacts of Brexit. European Parliament, Policy 
Department for Structural and Cohesion Policies, Brussels.  
Booth, S., Howarth, C., Persson, M., Ruparel, R., & Swidlicki, P. (2015). What if…? The Consequences, 
challenges & opportunities facing Britain outside EU. Open Europe. London, UK.  
Boulanger, P. & Phillipidis, G. (2015). The End of a Romance? A Note on the Quantitative Impacts of a 
‘Brexit’ from the EU. Journal of Agricultural Economics, 66 (3): 832-842.  
Busch, B. & Mattes, J. (2016). Brexit-The Economic Impact A Meta-Analysis. Institut der deutschen 
Wirtschaft Köln. IW Report. Cologne, Germany. 
Cantore, N., Kennan, J. & Page, S. (2011). CAP reform and development. Introduction, reform options 
and suggestions for further research. Overseas Development Institute. London, UK.  
Copenhagen Economics (2016). Impacts of EU trade agreements on the agricultural sector. European 
Commission, Report 978-92-79-51526. Doi: 10.2762/750618. Copenhagen, Denmark. 
Davis, J., Feng, S., Patton, M., & Binfield, J. (2017). Impacts of Alternative Post-Brexit Trad Agreements 
on UK Agriculture: Sector Analyses using the FAPRI-UK Model. Agri-Food and Biosciences 
Institute. Belfast, UK. 
Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) (2017). Agriculture in the United 
Kingdom. London, UK. Retrieved from https://www.gov.uk/government/statistical-data-
sets/agriculture-in-the-united-kingdom 
Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) (2018). Health and harmony: the future 
for food, farming and the environment in a green Brexit. London, UK. Retrieved 10 July 2019 
from https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-future-for-food-farming-and-the-
environment-policy-statement-2018 ) 
Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) (2019). Agriculture in the United 
Kingdom Datasets. Retrieved from https://www.gov.uk/government/statistical-data-
sets/agriculture-in-the-united-kingdom  
Dhingra, S., Huang, H., Ottaviano, G., Pessoa, J, P., Sampson, T., & Van Reenen, J. (2017). The costs and 
benefits of leaving the EU: trade effects. Centre for Economic Performance. Brexit Analysis. 
Technical Paper. London, UK. 
Dhingra, S., & Sampson, T. (2016). Life after Brexit: What are the UK’s options outside the European 
Union? Centre for Economic Performance, London School of Economics and Political Science. 
Paper Brexit 01. London, UK.  
Dhingra, S., Ottaviano, G., Sampson T. & Van Reenen, J. (2016). The consequences of Brexit for UK 
trade and living standards. In: Brexit 2016. Policy Analysis from the Centre for Economic 
Performance, London School of Economics and Political Science. London, UK. 
Downes, C., (2017). The Post-Brexit Management of EU Agricultural Tariff Rate Quotas. Journal of 





European Free Trade Association (EFTA) (2019). European Economic Area (EEA) / Relations with the 
EU - EEA Agreement - The Basic Features of the EEA Agreement. Retrieved 8 July 2019 
https://www.efta.int/eea/eea-agreement/eea-basic-features 
European Commission. (2013). Agricultural Policy Perspectives Brief N°5 Overview of CAP Reform 
2014-2020. Bruxelles, Belgium. Retrieved 14 July 2019 https://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/ 
sites/agriculture/files/policy-perspectives/policy-briefs/05_en.pdf. 
European Commission. (2016). Factsheet: Main elements of CETA. Retrieved 2 August 2018  
 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-445en.htm . 
European Commission. (2017a) CAP explained Direct Payments for farmers 2015-2020. Retrieved 11 
November 2018: https://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/sites/agriculture/files/direct-support/direct-
payments/docs/direct-payments-schemes_en.pdf  
European Commission (EC) (2017b). The European Single Market. Bruxelles, Belgium. Retrieved 11 
November 2018: https://ec.europa.eu/growth/single-market_en. 
European Commission (EC) (2018a). The common agricultural policy at a glance. Bruxelles, Belgium. 
Retrieved 11 November 2018: https://ec.europa.eu/info/food-farming-fisheries/key-
policies/common-agricultural-policy/cap-glance_en  
European Commission (EC) (2018b). Schengen Area. Bruxelles, Belgium. Retrieved 11 November 2018: 
https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/schengen_en . 
European Commission (EC) (2019). Trade Policy Countries and regions. Development Generalised 
Scheme of Preferences (GSP). Bruxelles. Retrieved 15 July 2019  
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/development/generalised-scheme-of-
preferences/ 
EuroStat. (2018). A closer look at EU agricultural exports and imports. Bruxelles, Belgium. Retrieved 11 
November 2018: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/-/DDN-
20180510-1?inheritRedirect=true . 
Figus, G., Lisenkova, K., McGregor, P., Roy, G. & Swales, K. (2018). The long-term economic implications 
of Brexit for Scotland: An interregional analysis. Papers in Regional Science. 97: 91-115. DOI: 
10.1111/pirs.12349.  
Holmes, P., Rollo, J., & Winters, L.A. (2016). Negotiation the UK’S Post Brexit trade arrangements. 
National Institute Economic Review, 238. 
HM Government (2017). The United Kingdom’s exit from and new partnership with the European 
Union. London, UK. Retrieved 11 November 2018: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/ 
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/589189/The_United_Kingdoms_e
xit_from_and_partnership_with_the_EU_Print.pdf  
HM Government (2018). EU Exit: Long-Term Economic Analysis. Technical Reference Paper. London, 
UK. Retrieved 11 November 2018: www.gov.uk/government/publications  
HM Treasury (2016). HM Treasury analysis: the long-term economic impact of EU membership and the 
alternatives. Presented to Parliament by the Chancellor of the Exchequer by Command of Her 
Majesty, April 2016. Retrieved 11 July 2018 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications  
House Commons (2013). Leaving the EU, Research Paper 13/42, 1 July 2013. London, UK. 
Hubbard, C., Davis, J., Feng, S., Harvey, D., Liddon, A., Moxey, A., Ojo, M., Patton, M., Phillippidis, G., 
Scott, C., Shresta, S. & Wallace, M. (2018). Brexit: How Will UK Agriculture Fare? EuroChoices. 





Jongeneel, R., van Berkum, S. & Vrolijk, H. (2016). Brexit: Breaking Away- Would it Pay. EuroChoices 
15(2): 26-33. DOI: 0.1111/1746-692X.12130.  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2015). Agricultural. Oslo, Norway. Retrieved on 7 July 2018: 
https://www.regjeringen.no/en/topics/european-policy/areas-
cooperation/agriculture/id686224/  
Potton, E. & Webb, D. (2017) Brexit: Agriculture and Trade. House of Commons. Briefing paper, number 
7974.  
Price Waterhouse Coopers (PwC). (2016). Leaving the EU: Implications for the UK economy. Discussion 
Paper. London, UK. 
Revell, B. J. (2017). Brexit and Tariff Rate Quotas on EU Imports: A Complex Problem. EuroChoices 
16(2). Doi: 10.1111/1746-692X.12157. 
Saunders, C. (2003). Changes in EU Agricultural Policy and their potential impacts on Australia, New 
Zealand and Japanese Dairy Sectors. Asia-Pacific Journal of EU Studies, (1) 2: 161-177. 
Saunders, C. (2008). The future of New Zealand – European Union relations. In; Gibbons. M. New 
Zealand and the European Union. Pearson Prentice Hall.  
Saunders, J., Saunders, C., McLellan, B., Obadovic, I. & T. Driver (2016). Modelling Agricultural Impacts 
of EU-NZ Tarde Liberalisation. Research Report No 341. AERU. Lincoln University.  
Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft (Federal Department of Foreign Affairs FDFA) (2016). Switzerland 
and the European Union. Bern, Switzerland. Retrieved 5 August 2018: 
https://www.eda.admin.ch/dam/eda/en/documents/publications/EuropaeischeAngelegenheit
en/Schweiz-und-EU_en.pdf. 
Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft (Federal Department of Foreign Affairs FDFA) (2018). 
Schengen/Dublin – a common border. Bruxelles, Belgium. Accessed in September 2018: 
https://www.eda.admin.ch/missions/mission-eu-brussels/en/home/key-issues/schengen-
dublin.html. 
Sik Choi, H., Jansson, T., Matthews, A., Mittenzwei, K., Himics, M. & Höglind, L. (2019). European 
agriculture after Brexit: Does anyone benefit from the divorce?. Working Oaoer 2019:1. Agri-
Food Economics Centre. Lund, Sweden.  
Statistics New Zealand (2018a). Infoshare. Imports and Exports. Harmonised Trade. Wellington, NZ.  
Statistics New Zealand (2018b). Global New Zealand – International trade, investment, and travel 
profile: Year ended December 2017. Wellington, NZ.  
Swinbank, A. (2017). World Trade Rules and the Policy Options for British Agriculture Post-Brexit. UK 
Trade Policy Observatory. Briefing Paper 7. January 2017. University of Sussex. Falmer, Sussex, 
UK. 
The Andersons Centre (2019). Red Meat Route to Market Report May 19. The Anderson Centre. Report 
prepared for AHDB, QMS and Hybu Cig Cimru. Leicestershire, UK. 
Ungphakorn, P. (2017). In the event of a no deal Brexit, can the UK become the Singapore of the North 
Atlantic? In: The UK in a changing Europe. What would trading on WTO terms mean for the UK. 
King’s College London. London, UK. 
Van Berkum, S., Jongeneel, R. A., Vrolijk, H.C.J., van Leeuwen, M.G.A., and Jager, J.H. (2016). 
Implications of a UK exit from the EU for British agriculture. Study for the National Farmers’ 
Union (NFU). Warwickshire, UK. Wageningen, LEI Wageningen UK (University & Research 





Van Berkum, S., Jongeneel, R. & Van Leeuwen, M. (2018). Brexit's Agri-trade impacts on the 
Netherlands. EuroChoices. 17 (2). 38-46. DOI: 10.1111/1746-692X.12201.  
World Trade Organisation (WTO) (2018). Understanding the WTO. Principles of the trading system. 










Appendix: Literature Review ‐Result Tables 
 
Table 1.1: MFN Tariffs implemented in WTO default scenario, (Davis et al., 2017). 
Products MFN Tariff 
Beef Carcass 12.8% plus €176.89/100 kg 
Sheep Carcass 12.8% plus €171.3/100 kg 
Pig Carcasses €53.6/100kg 
Chicken Carcasses €32.5/100kg 











Table 1.2: Projected changes in the livestock sectors in the UK, percentage difference in 2025 by 









Cattle 1% 18% -42% 
Beef cows 0% 6% -2% 
Dairy cows 0% 10% -14% 
Total Cattle 0% 11% -17% 
Beef 
Production 0% 10% -10% 
Domestic use -1% -3% 18% 
Export -2% -100% -100% 
Exports from UK to EU27 -2% -100% -100% 
Exports from UK to non-EU -2% -100% -100% 
Import -3% -70% 38% 
Imports from EU27 to UK -3% -92% -100% 
Imports from non-EU to UK -3% 94% 1103% 
Cattle price 3% 17% -45% 
Sheep 
Ewes 0% -13% -12% 
Total Sheep 0% 9% 16% 
Sheep meat 0% -73% -86% 
Production -1% -83% -84% 
Domestic use 0% 9% 16% 
Exports 0% -73% -86% 
Exports from UK to EU27 -1% -83% -84% 
Exports from UK to non-EU 0% -23% -100% 
Import 0% -17% -15% 
Imports from EU27 to UK -1% -100% -100% 
Import from non-EU to UK  0% -7% -5% 
Sheep meat price -1% -30% -29% 
Pig 
Sows 1% 21% -8% 
Total pigs 1% 23% -8% 
Pig meat       
Production 1% 22% -6% 
Domestic use 0% -6% 5% 
Export 0% -100% -100% 
Exports from UK to EU27 -1% -100% -100% 
Exports from UK to non-EU 0% -100% -100% 





Imports from EU27 to UK -1% -57% -31% 
Imports from non-EU to UK 0% 0% 7811% 
Pig meat reference price 0% 18% -12% 
Poultry 
Production 0% 11% -3% 
Domestic use 0% -2% 1% 
Export -2% 0% -43% 
Exports from UK to EU27 -2% -100% -100% 
Exports from UK to Non-EU 0% 408% 189% 
Import -1% -40% -8% 
Imports from EU27 to UK -1% -81% -100% 
Imports from Non-EU to UK 0% 686% 1603% 








Table 1.3: Projected changes in the Dairy sectors in the UK, percentage difference in 2025 by 
scenario compared to the baseline (Davis et al., 2017). 









Cow's milk production 0% 7% -2% 
Liquid consumption 0% -3% 1% 
Manufacturing use 1% 18% -6% 
Prices       
Producer milk price 1% 30% -10% 
Cheese price 1% 29% -11% 
Butter price 0% 43% -11% 
WMP price 0% 0% 0% 
SMP price 0% 0% 0% 
  
Cheese 
Production 1% 19% -4% 
Domestic use 0% -4% 2% 
Export -2% -100% -88% 
Exports from UK to EU27 -3% -100% -27% 
Exports from UK to Non-EU 0% -100% -100% 
Import -2% -54% 0% 
Imports from EU27 to UK -2% -55% -28% 
Imports from Non-EU to 
UK 
-13% -23% 380% 
  
Butter 
Production 0% 25% -2% 
Domestic use 0% -11% 4% 
Export -4% -100% -100% 
Export from UK to EU27 -5% -100% -100% 
Exports from UK to Non-EU 1% -100% -100% 
Import -2% -97% -26% 
Import from EU27 to UK -2% -100% -100% 
Imports from Non-EU to 
UK 







Table 1.4: Projected changes in the crop sector sectors in the UK, percentage difference in 2025 by 
scenario compared to the baseline (Davis et al., 2017).  









Production 0% -1% -1% 
Domestic use 0% 6% -2% 
Export -3% -77% -34% 
Export from UK to EU27 -4% -100% -100% 
Exports from UK to Non-EU -1% -25% 166% 
Import -1% -66% -62% 
Import from EU27 to UK -1% -93% -96% 
Imports from Non-EU to UK -1% -20% -6% 
        
Barley 
Production 0% -1% -2% 
Domestic use 0% 7% -2% 
Export -3% -42% -8% 
Exports from UK to EU27 -5% -78% -78% 
Exports from UK to Non-EU 0% 12% 97% 
Import -3% -100% -100% 
Imports from EU-27 to UK -3% -100% -100% 
Imports from Non-EU to UK -2% -100% -100% 
        
Area 
Wheat 0% -1% -1% 
Barley 0% -1% -1% 
        
Prices 
Wheat -1% -4% -5% 








Table 1.5: Percentage difference in price, production, consumption and trade in Scenario 1 (FTA, 
5% trade facilitation costs and a 3% negative price wedge for sheep meat) a) compared to the 






























































Price 5.0 5.0 5.0 4.9 4.6 4.9 4.9 4.5 2.3 4.3 5.0 5.0 4.9 5.5 
Production 1.2 1.2 0.1 1.1 1.1 0.7 1.5 -0.8 1.1 1.1 0.1 0.1 18.9 7.8 
Use 1.2 0.4 1.8 0.0 -0.1 -0.4 0.0 0.0 2.2   -0.2 -1.1 0.0 0.0 
Net 
exports b) 
  9.5 -7.4           
-
48.7 
      1333.0   
Net 
imports b) 










Table 1.6: Percentage difference in price, production, consumption and trade in Scenario 2 (WTO 
default, 8% trade facilitation costs, UK loses access to the EU’s preferential import regimes) 































































Price 8.0 8.0 8.0 11.5 7.4 7.8 8.1 7.1 8.8 7.2 8.8 8.3 7.8 9.3 
Production 
2.0 2.0 0.2 2.9 1.5 1.2 2.5 
-
1.3 





2.1 0.6 2.9 -0.1 -0.1 
-
0.6 








  16.6 
-
12.4 
          326.0       2285.0   
Net 
imports a) 






















Table 1.7: The impact of a UK Trade Liberalisation scenario (50% border tariff reduction and 8% 
trade facilitation costs), in percentage difference in price, production, consumption and trade 

































































Price 7.9 8.0 8.0 -4.6 -14.9 -3.3 -6.6 8.7 -4.7 2.2 -0.6 3.9 8.0 3.8 
Production 1.3 1.3 0.5 -1.9 -6.6 -1.9 -2.5 -1.2 -6.6 -0.7 -1.9 0.5 -2.6 -1.7 
Use -2.3 0.4 2.9 0.0 0.6 -1.7 0.1 0.0 -1.8   0.1 -0.9 0.0 0.0 
Net 
exports a) 
  10.8 -10.0           -206.0       -181.0   
Net 
imports a) 




Table 1.8: Projected Impacts on Beef and Sheepmeat Offal under Brexit Deal (The Andersons 
Centre, 2019). 
 
Beef Offal Sheepmeat Offal Total Offal 
Measure Base Deal % ch Base Deal % ch Base Deal % ch 
UK Production 54.9 55.0 0.2 19.0 18.9 -1.0 73.9 73.8 -0.1 
Exports 43.1 43.1 -0.1 6.1 6.1 -0.5 49.3 49.3 -0.1 
     To EU 21.2 21.0 -0.8 3.5 3.5 -0.8 24.8 24.6 -0.8 
     To Non-EU 21.9 22.1 0.7 2.6 2.6 0.9 24.5 24.7 0.7 
Imports 11.8 11.8 -0.2 7.9 7.9 0.0 19.8 19.8 -0.1 
     EU 11.8 11.8 -0.2 1.0 1.0 -0.2 12.8 12.8 -0.2 
     Non-EU 0.1 0.1 0.0 6.9 6.9 0.0 7.0 7.0 0.0 
Estimated 








Table 1.9: Projected No Deal Impacts on Beef and Sheepmeat Offal (‘000 Tones) (The Andersons 
Centre, 2019). 
 
Beef Offal Sheepmeat Offal Total Offal 
Measure Base Deal % ch Base Deal % ch Base Deal % ch 
UK Production 54.9 54.9 0.0 19.0 17.3 -9.0 73.9 72.2 -2.3 
Exports 43.1 43.5 0.9 6.1 6.2 -0.2 49.3 49.7 0.8 
     To EU 21.2 19.8 -6.5 3.5 3.6 -0.3 24.8 23.4 -5.6 
     To Non-EU 21.9 23.7 8.1 2.6 2.6 5.1 24.5 27.3 7.2 
Imports 11.8 9.0 -24.2 7.9 7.9 -0.3 19.8 16.9 -14.6 
     EU 11.8 8.8 -25.0 1.0 1.0 -2.6 12.8 9.8 -23.3 
     Non-EU 0.1 0.1 166.6 6.9 6.9 0.0 7.0 7.1 1.3 
Estimated 
Consumption 23.6 20.3 -13.8 20.8 19.1 -8.3 44.4 39.4 -11.2 
 
 
 
